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Abstract
In this paper the effect of manure production rights on investment decisions of Dutch pig
farmers is examined. A dynamic optimization model of investment that explicitly takes zero
investments into account is augmented by a constraint on production arising from the
introduction of manure production rights. In the theoretical model it is shown that such a
constraint has a reducing effect on investment. The presence of this constraint is tested for
using GMM structural break tests. The results provide evidence for the hypothesis that
manure production rights have reduced investments through its effect on production.
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The impact of manure production rights on capital
investment in the Dutch pig sector
Introduction
Since the 1950’s the Dutch pig sector has witnessed a rapid growth. In this period the number
of pigs rose from around 2 million pigs in 1950 to about 16 million in the mid-nineties. What
also grew rapidly was a surplus of manure produced by this increasing number of pigs. In
order to curb this manure surplus, the Dutch government implemented a number of
environmental policies in the 1980’s and 1990’s. During the first period of legislation, which
lasted from 1984 to 1986, expansion of production was directly restricted by a number of
prohibitive rules. However, due to a large use of exceptional dispositions and a possibly weak
control system this law did not achieve its objectives. A second period of agri-environmental
legislation began in 1987 with the introduction of a system of non-tradable manure production
rights. In 1994 legislation was revised and the manure production rights became tradable.
Given the close technical relation between the amount of manure produced (total of manure
production rights) and the total production level, restrictions on manure production also
implied an (indirect) constraint on pig production.
An argument often brought forward against quantitative restrictions on production (e.g.
supply quota) is that they hamper structural development. Since farmers cannot expand their
farm business, expansionary investments are not profitable and the total amount of
investments is reduced. A consequence of lower investments is that the speed of innovation is
reduced, deteriorating the long-run productivity of the sector (Richards and Jeffrey, 1997).
Concern about reduced investments was one of the arguments for the Dutch government to
make manure production rights tradable in 1994, since reduced investments also implied that
investments that contributed to solving the manure problem were reduced (LNV, 1996).2
Whether output was restricted by the system of manure production rights in the period
1987-1996 is uncertain. Although the growth in pig numbers was halted and investment was
somewhat lower than before, it is not well understood whether farms were output constrained
or not. The quantity of manure production rights was allotted on the basis of historical
production levels which farmers had to indicate themselves. Farmers may have come up with
numbers based on maximum production capacity instead of historical production levels, thus
creating future possibilities for expansion of production (Frouws, 1994). Furthermore, the
decrease in investment may have had other causes. Low output prices in this period may have
reduced expected gains from investment or deteriorated the financial situation of farmers.
The objective of this paper is to test whether manure production rights constrained capital
investment in the Dutch pig sector over the period 1987-1996 through an indirect constraint
on production. In order to address this research question an inter-temporal model of
investment is developed. For the period 1987-1996, in which manure production rights may
have limited manure production on individual farms, the model is augmented by a (potentially
binding) constraint on pig production. Whether this constraint was indeed binding is tested for
empirically. From the inter-temporal optimization problem of farmers, necessary first-order
conditions are derived and solved for analytically using the Euler equation method. The
combined first-order condition is estimated directly using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) estimation technique. In order to test for the presence of a binding
constraint on production a GMM structural stability test is used (Hall, 1999).
The model presented in this paper differs from previous empirical Euler equation studies
(e.g. Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983; Whited, 1998) in the way zero investments are taken into
account. Previous studies consider zero investment to be optimal when the marginal benefits
of investing equal the purchase price of capital. Following theoretical work by Chavas (1994),
in this paper it is assumed that investment is zero for the range in which the marginal benefits3
of investing are equal to or smaller than the purchase price of capital. From the theoretical
model regimes for positive and zero investments are derived.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, a constraint on production is modeled
explicitly into an Euler equation framework. Using structural stability tests for GMM this
constraint is tested for. Second, the empirical Euler equation framework is extended to
include a threshold for investment, in order to explain zero investments explicitly. The paper
is built up as follows. In the next section a short overview of Dutch manure policies in the
1980’s and 1990’s is given. Section three develops the theoretical framework of this paper. In
section four the empirical model, the testing procedure and other estimation issues are
discussed. A description of the data is given in section five. Results are presented in section
six and conclusions are drawn in section seven.
Manure policies
Growing manure surpluses in Dutch intensive livestock production have led to increasing
environmental concerns over the last two decades. In order to curb these manure surpluses the
government implemented a number of environmental policies in the 1980’s and 1990’s. For
an overview of the various elements of these agri-environmental policies see Haerkens and
Walda (1994) and Heisterkamp and Bruil (1998). In this section an overview is given of those
policy elements that aimed at restricting manure production
1.
1984-1986
In 1984 the first legislation directly aiming at controlling manure production in the intensive
livestock sector was introduced. The Interimwet beperking varkens- en pluimveehouderijen
prohibited the expansion of existing farms in the south and east of the Netherlands (so-called
concentration regions) by more than 10% and by more than 75% for farms in other parts of4
the country. Furthermore, it was not possible to establish a new farm with intensive livestock
production. However, due to a large use of exceptional dispositions and a possibly weak
control system this law did not achieve its objectives. In the period 1984-1987 the number of
pigs increased by 28% (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1990). Therefore, the limiting effects of this
law on production and investment are assumed to be minimal.
1987-1993
In 1987 phosphate based manure production rights were introduced in order to restrict the
production of manure. Farms received manure production rights proportional to 125 kg
phosphate per hectare (acreage based manure production rights). Moreover, each farm was
allotted a reference quota of manure production rights based on the inventory of animals and
standards for the manure production by animal category. By determining the area of farmland
owned or long term leased, the difference between the acreage based phosphate rights and the
reference quota could be calculated in order to make a distinction between manure surplus
and manure deficit farms (i.e. farms with manure production larger or smaller than 125 kg
phosphate per hectare). Until 1994 trade in manure production rights was prohibited. Only in
very special occasions (e.g. with marriage or heritage or the transfer of a complete farm)
farmers could obtain additional manure production rights. Buying additional land increased
the amount of acreage based manure production rights, but this only allowed an increase in
manure production for manure deficit farms. Most pig farms however, were typically manure
surplus farms and therefore could not expand manure production by buying additional land.
1994-1996
In 1994 new legislation was enacted that allowed trade of manure production rights to some
extent. The amount of acreage based manure production rights could not be traded. Pig based5
manure production rights could be used for manure production of any type of animal but not
vice versa. Furthermore, geographical restrictions on trade were set. Farmers within one of the
two concentration regions could trade within their region, but could not buy manure
production rights outside their region. Moreover, from the production rights transferred, 25%
of them were siphoned by the government. In addition, a farmer who acquired additional
manure production rights had to certify that he had either sufficient land to apply his total
amount of manure or had a manure disposal contract with another farm. In the period 1994-
1996, 6.4% of the total amount of tradable production rights was traded (LNV, 1996).
Theoretical framework
In this section a theoretical model of Dutch pig farmers optimizing over time is developed.
Making assumptions on the objective of farmers and the constraints faced in optimizing,
necessary first-order conditions (f.o.c.’s) for optimal investment are derived. Using the so-
called Euler equation approach these f.o.c.’s are combined into a necessary optimality
condition holding over two subsequent time periods. Examples of the Euler equation
approach can be found in e.g. Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) and Whited (1998).
The objective of pig farmers is assumed to be the maximization of the expected stream of
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where PVh,t is the expected present value for farm h at time t, Eh,t is the expectations operator
conditional on the information available to farm h at time t and rt+j is the discount rate which
is defined as:
( ) 1 and 1
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where rt+i is the real interest rate. Equation (1) is maximized subject to the following
constraint:
( ) ( ) t h
I
t t h t h t t h t h t h t t h I p I X w Z K X F p CF , , , , , , , , , ￿ - - - = y (2)
Equation (2) defines cash flows for farm h in year t as revenues of production minus variable
costs, adjustment costs and investment expenditure. Total production of pig output in year t,
given by the production function F(.), depends upon a vector of variable inputs Xh,t, an
aggregate quasi-fixed capital input Kh,t, and a vector of fixed factors Zh,t. Output price is pt and
wt denotes a vector of input prices. The adjustment cost function y is dependent on the size of
gross investments in year t, Ih,t. The following assumptions on the adjustment cost function
are made: y is non-negative, is zero at zero investment and convex in investment. Examples
of adjustment costs are learning costs, costs of restructuring the production process,
administrative costs in obtaining building or environmental licenses, the value of time spent
on preparing the investment, fees paid to banks in order to get a loan etc. Investment
expenditure consists of the expenditure on new capital goods where p
I
t denotes the unit
purchase price of capital. The capital stock is defined by
( ) 1 , , , 1 - - + = t h t h t h K I K d (3)
stating that the current capital stock consists of last year’s capital stock, corrected for
depreciation (d is the depreciation rate), plus current investment. In this study, investment is
assumed to be greater than or equal to zero
2.
Manure policy aims at restricting the amount manure produced. Given the close
relationship between the physical pig output and the amount of manure produced (total of
manure production rights), a system of manure production rights indirectly limits physical
production. The effect of manure production rights on investment is therefore modeled by a7
potentially binding constraint on production. Production cannot exceed an upper bound  h t F , ,
which depends upon the quantity of manure production rights a farm has:
t h t h t h t h F Z K X F , , , , ) , , ( £ (4)
This constraint is included in the model. Note however that in years in which manure policies
were absent (1980-1983) or not assumed to be constraining production (1984-1986), the
constraint is not binding and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier is zero, removing the
constraint for these years.
The problem given by the set of equations (1)-(4) can be summarized by considering it as a
dynamic programming problem with corresponding Bellman equation:
( )
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where individual farm subscripts h are left out for convenience. The present value at time t
depends upon the given state Kt-1. In period t the control variable It is set to an optimal level
such that in period t+1 the state variable is Kt. In order to take the restriction on production
(4) into account and to obtain first-order conditions the Lagrangian is written:
( ) ( ) ( )
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Note that the Lagrange multiplier mt differs by farm and over time. From the Kuhn-Tucker











































































These optimality conditions for both regimes provide a theoretical explanation for observed
positive and zero investment. Equation (7a) states that if a farmer invests, investments are8
made until marginal benefits and marginal costs of investment are equated. The marginal
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1 r , which reflects the change in the
present value due to an increase of the capital stock. Marginal costs of investment consist of
marginal adjustment costs  t t I ¶ ¶y  and the unit purchase price of capital p
I
t. No investment is
undertaken when the marginal benefits of investing are less than marginal costs of investment.
This is given by equation (7b).
Differentiating either the Lagrangian in (6) or the Bellman equation in (5) with respect to
state variable Kt-1 yields:
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Using equations (7) this condition can be rewritten to:
























































Using equations (9) one period ahead and substituting them into equations (7) makes it
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following expressions after some rewriting:
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1 1 1 1 0 , 0 (10b)9
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1 1 1 1 0 , 0 (10c)
Note that there is one case for which no expression can be obtained, viz. It = 0, It+1 = 0. The
reason is that inequality (9b) one period ahead combined with inequality (7b), does not allow
substituting out the unobservable dynamic shadow price.
These combined first order conditions have the following interpretation. The right hand
side sums up the marginal costs minus the marginal benefits of investing today. The marginal
costs consist of the unit purchase price of capital and the marginal adjustment cost. The
marginal benefit consists of the value of marginal product in year t, which is not obtained if
investment takes place in year t+1. The left-hand side represents the expected discounted sum
of marginal costs of investment in period t+1. So, essentially these first-order conditions are a
comparison of marginal investment costs over two periods. If investment takes place in both
periods t and t+1, the costs in both periods should be equal, as given in equation (10a). The
case of no investment in year t and positive investment in year t+1, case (10b), corresponds
with higher marginal costs of investment in year t compared to t+1 whereas for (10c) the
opposite holds.








the Lagrange multiplier being non-negative by definition and the marginal product of capital
expected to be positive from production theory, the total term is expected to be positive.
Therefore, for a given expected marginal investment cost in year t+1 and with a binding
constraint on production (mt>0), the equilibrium condition holds for a smaller level of
investment compared to a situation without a constraint on production. So, from this
theoretical model it follows that optimal investment is reduced in the presence of a binding
constraint on production.10
Empirical model and estimation
Empirical analysis proceeds by estimating the first-order conditions derived from the
theoretical model directly. However, since conditions (10b) and (10c) contain inequality signs
and since no expression could be obtained for the case of zero investments in two subsequent
years, only equation (10a) is estimated. As shown below, this implies a sample selection
problem that has to be corrected for. Other issues that are dealt with in this section are the
specification of functional forms for the production function and the adjustment cost function
and the specification of the expectations formation process. Furthermore, the panel nature of
the data has to be accounted for in estimation. Finally, the unobservable Lagrange multipliers
mht have to be dealt with. After expounding the estimation method a testing procedure is
described that allows for testing whether the constraint on production, arising from manure
policies, was binding or not.
For the production function a quadratic functional form with two variable inputs (feed and
other variable inputs), one aggregated quasi-fixed capital good (consisting of buildings,
machinery and equipment) and three fixed factors (family labor, land and technological
change) is used:
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where xi,h,t denotes respectively aggregated capital (i=1), feed input (i=2), other variable input
(i=3), labour (i=4), land (i=5) and technological change (i=6).
For the adjustment cost function a flexible specification is used:
( )          I I I I
3
t h 3 3
1 2
t h 2 2
1
t h 1 t h , , , , b b b y + + = (12)
Whited (1998) favored a flexible specification over the standard quadratic adjustment cost
function using a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms. He found that a quadratic specification
resulted in negative adjustment cost, whereas the flexible specification restored the positive11
relation between investment and adjustment costs. Moreover, specification testing did not
reject the flexible specification. An advantage of this flexible specification is that it allows for
a variety of different adjustment cost functions (e.g. linear, quadratic, asymmetric adjustment
costs). For this function to be convex in investment the second derivative with respect to
investment,  ( ) t h 3 2 t h II I 2 I , , b b y + = , has to be greater than zero.
Assuming rational expectations, the unobserved expected values of t+1 variables are
replaced by their realized counterparts and an expectation error et+1 that captures the
difference between the expected and realized values is added. Using the first order derivative
of (11) with respect to capital and the first order derivative of (12) with respect to investment
and substituting them into (10a), the following expression is obtained after some rewriting:
( ) ( )
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1 , + + = t h t h e E s  and that  1 , + t h e  is uncorrelated
with any time t information. However, although expectations on period t+1 variables are
orthogonal to the expectation errors since they are a function of period t variables, their
realized t+1 values are not. Therefore, OLS estimates will be inconsistent and an instrumental
variable estimator is necessary. In principle any period t variable can be used as an
instrument. The Generalized Method of Moments (GMM; for an overview see Mátyás, 1999)
is used to estimate (13) since it directly uses the above orthogonality conditions in the
estimation procedure. Period t information is used in a vector of instruments zh,t and the
moment condition is rewritten as  ( ) 0 1 , , , = ￿ + t h t h t h e z E , where eh,t+1 is defined in (13).
The panel nature of the data used allows for adding farm-specific effects to the error term.
These farm-specific effects are assumed to be fixed and may reflect farm-specific differences
in marginal adjustment costs or farm-specific expectation errors. To remove the fixed effects12
equation (13) must be estimated in first-differences. Taking first-differences implies that the
linear term of the adjustment cost function is removed. It also implies that the choice of
instruments is limited. Period t variables are now correlated with the first-differenced
expectation errors and are therefore no longer valid instruments. The moment condition now
becomes  ( ) 0 1 , 1 , = D + - t h t h e z E  where D denotes first-differences. Valid instruments in GMM
estimation with panel data consist of period t-1 and earlier values of model variables
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The instrument set consists of two and more periods lagged
values of investment, investment squared, the purchase price of capital, the output price, the
price of feed, the price of other variable input and quantities of capital, family labor and land
and technological change.
As shown in section two, the inter-temporal optimality conditions only yields an equality
condition if investment is non-zero in both periods t and t+1. Therefore, following Alonso-
Borrego (1998), estimation is conditioned on the event  ( ) 1 0 , 1 , 1 , = „ ￿ G = + + t h t h t h I I D , where
G(.) is the indicator function, which takes value one if the condition is true and zero otherwise.
The corresponding sample selection rule is defined as:
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where Dh,t+1 is a latent variable, g a vector of parameters and xh,t+1 the residual of the selection
equation. Under this conditioning event, the population moment condition is partitioned as:
( ) ( ) ( )
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From the partitioning it follows that the moment condition, conditional on Dh,t+1=1 differs
from the population moment condition and in general cannot expected to be zero since it only
represents part of the distribution of expectation errors. Using the above partitioning of the
population moment condition (15), the conditional moment condition is rewritten as:13
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where s is the covariance between Deh,t+1 and xh,t+1 (normalized by the variance of xh,t+1),
( ) 1 t h Z + - , g f  is a normal density function and  ( ) 1 t h Z + - F , g  is a normal distribution function.
The ratio  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 t h 1 t h Z 1 Z + + - F - - , , g g f  is the Inverse Mill’s ratio, which is denoted as lh,t+1.
Correcting for sample selection bias, the following moment condition is assumed to hold:
( ) ( ) 0 1 D e z E 1 t h 1 t h 1 t h 1 t h = = - D + + + - , , , , | sl (17)
Substituting the lh,t+1 by consistent estimates based on reduced-form probit estimates,
equations (17) are estimated using GMM. Since it is not possible to estimate a fixed effects
probit model (Maddala, 1987), the farm-specific effects cannot taken into account in
calculating the Inverse Mill’s ratio. Define  ( ) ( ) 1 t h 1 t h 1 t h h t h e z y f + + - - D = , , , , , sl q , where yh is a
vector of all model variables and instruments in (17) for farm h and q is the vector of



























, q q q , then
GMM q ˆ is the estimator that minimises the objective function:
( ) ( ) ( ) q q q , ,
1 y f V y f Q
- ¢ = (18)
where V
-1 is a weighting matrix. The GMM estimator is particularly apt for equations like
(17). It can handle non-linear equations and allows for heteroskedastic errors.
In the equation to be estimated the unobserved Lagrange multipliers mh,t, corresponding to
the constraint on production, are present. An approach that is often applied in the literature on
borrowing constraints (see e.g. Whited, 1992; Hubbard and Kashyap, 1992) is to assume that
the unobservable Lagrange multipliers are a linear function of some observable variables and
to substitute this function into the Euler equation. If borrowing constraints are present then the14
parameters of the substituted function should be significant and a reduction in the value of the
GMM objective function should be observed. However, instead of this (arbitrary) substitution
of the unobservable Lagrange multipliers by related variables, in this paper the presence of
binding constraints on production in the Euler investment equation is directly tested for. The
testing procedure is based on structural stability tests for GMM developed by Hall and Sen
(1999).
In order to explain the testing procedure, equation (13) is rewritten so that the product of
the Lagrange multiplier with the marginal product of capital is on the right-hand side:
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Since interest is in the potential constraining effects of the system of manure production rights
introduced in 1987, the constraint on production is assumed to be present from 1987 on. In the
years before 1987, the Lagrange multiplier is assumed to be zero. So, estimation before 1987
is straightforward using the left-hand side in estimation. If from 1987 on the constraint is not
binding for farms, estimation does not differ from the period before 1987 since the left-hand
side of (19) again defines the expectation error in the moment condition. However, if the
constraint is binding for farms over a number of years, the left-hand side of (19), which
determines eh,t+1 in the unconstrained case, cannot be expected to be zero anymore, due to the
presence of the positive Lagrange multiplier. Therefore, a natural way of testing for the
presence of a production constraint is to test whether or not the moment conditions, based on
the left-hand side of (20), hold before and after 1987. This is similar to testing whether the
overidentifying restrictions hold before and after 1987 because if the production constraint is
present and binding after 1987, a model that does not take this constraint into account is
misspecified
3. So, the null hypothesis states that the overidentifying restrictions hold both15
before and after the structural breakpoint 1987
4, which is similar to the hypothesis that the
constraint on production was not binding. The alternative is that the overidentifying
restrictions do not hold in the period after 1987, which may have been caused by the binding
constraint on production. The test statistic is defined as  2 1 J J J + =  where J1 and J2 are the
J-test statistics from the overidentifying restrictions test for respectively the period before and
after 1987. Under the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions hold in both periods
the test statistic follows a c
2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal to twice the number
of overidentifying restrictions (Hall and Sen, 1999).
Data
Data on specialized pig farms covering the period 1980-1996 are obtained from a stratified
sample of Dutch farms keeping accounts on behalf of the Dutch Agricultural Economics
Research Institute (LEI) farm accounting system. Farms were selected if the share of pig
output in total output exceeds 80%. The farms remain in the panel for about five to seven
years, so the panel is unbalanced.
An implicit value for capital is obtained by dividing the sum of capital invested in
buildings, machinery and equipment by a Tornquist price index. Capital investment is defined
as the sum of investments and dis-investments. In estimation the discount factor and the
depreciation rate are considered constant. The discount factor used is based on the average
real interest rate over the estimation period and equals 0.95. The depreciation rate for capital
is assumed to be 5%. The first-order derivative of the production function with respect to
capital contains two variable inputs, pig feed and other variable inputs (e.g. veterinary costs,
heating, electricity, hired labor and various other costs) and capital, family labor, land and
technological change. The output price is a Tornquist price index calculated with prices
obtained from LEI/Statistics Netherlands (several years). The implicit quantity of capital is16
measured at constant 1980 prices, total farm family labor is measured in hours and land is
measured in hectares.
Taking first differences and using twice-lagged values of endogenous variables implies
that only farms with three or more observations can be used in estimation and that data for
1980 and 1981 can only be used as instruments. Removing farms with one or two
observations and 13 observations with negative investments results in a data set with 882
observations on 281 farms. Basic statistics of the data are given in table 1.
INSERT TABLE 1
Table 2 gives averages for investment for the three periods of interest in this study: the
period before the introduction of the manure production rights (1980-1986), the period in
which these non-tradable rights were introduced (1987-1993) and the period in which these
rights were made tradable to some extent (1994-1996). Looking at sample averages for
investment as given in table 2 suggests that the system of manure production rights has
reduced investments.
INSERT TABLE 2
As shown in the first column of table 2, average investment does not differ much for the first
two periods but it is considerably higher in the period 1994-1996. However, looking at
investment only does not take the ongoing increase in scale of farms into account. Therefore
in the second column the investment/capital ratio is given. This ratio suggests that investment
was considerably lower in the period 1987-1993 than in the other two periods. The higher
investment/capital ratio in the period 1994-1996 suggests that the limited tradability of the17
manure production rights in this period raised investments again. Although the observed
pattern of average investment is what would be expected, this does not necessarily imply that
the observed pattern is due to restrictions imposed by manure policy. Other variables could be
the real underlying cause (e.g. low output prices). The model developed in the previous two
sections takes into account the various variables that have an impact on investment and can
therefore provide a better answer to the question whether manure policy has restricted
investment than looking at the averages in table 2.
Results
In this section estimation results and the results of the testing procedure for production
constraints are discussed. In order to control for sample selection bias, arising from using only
observations with positive investment in the estimation of the inter-temporal optimality
condition (14), first a probit reduced form is estimated for the event Dh,t+1=1. In order to have
the Inverse Mill’s ratio uncorrelated with the prediction error, two-, three- and four-period
lagged variables are used in this reduced probit estimation. Using these parameter estimates,
the Inverse Mill’s ratio is calculated for observations with positive investment in two
consecutive periods and is included in the Euler equation as additional regressor. Parameter
estimates for the Euler equation over the whole period 1982-1996 are given in the first
column of table 3.
INSERT TABLE 3
For the total sample period 5 of the 11 parameters are significant at the 5% level. The
parameters from the marginal product of capital (aij’s) that are significantly different from
zero at the 5% level have the following interpretation. The value marginal product of capital18
is increasing in the stock of capital (parameter not significantly different from zero at 5%
level), feed input (significant), labor and land (both not significant). It is decreasing in output
price (not significant), other variable inputs (significant) and technological change
(significant). From equation (13) it follows that a high marginal product of capital has a
positive effect on investment in period t. So, large quantities of capital, feed, labor and land
have a positive effect on investment in period t, whereas the output price, other variable
inputs and technological change have a negative effect on investment. Although they are not
significant at the 5% level, especially the signs of the stock of capital and the output price are
opposite to their expected signs. Using the parameters aij it can also be checked whether the
production function is increasing in capital for all observations. It appears that for only 50%
of the observations this theoretical restriction holds. The parameter estimates for the
adjustment cost function are not in accordance with standard adjustment cost theory. The
negative parameter for the quadratic term (significant at the 5% level) suggests that marginal
adjustment costs are decreasing over a large range. Due to the positive cubic term (not
significant) marginal adjustment costs will eventually rise again. Whether adjustment costs
are positive over the whole range depends upon the linear adjustment cost term. However, this
was removed by first-differencing and it is not possible to calculate this parameter ex post
since it cannot be separated from the average of the farm-specific effect. The implication of
the non-linear adjustment cost terms is that for a large range of investments it is optimal to
invest more than the observed quantity, since marginal adjustment costs are decreasing in this
range. That farmers do not invest more may be due to restrictions (e.g. credit restrictions or
restrictions imposed by the (local) government) preventing them from investing optimal
quantities. The parameter of the Inverse Mill’s ratio is significant at the 5% level, indicating
that using only positive observations without correction using an Inverse Mill’s Ratio, yields
biased estimates due to sample selection.19
The impact of manure production rights
The J-statistic, which is the test statistic for testing whether the overidentifying restrictions
hold, has a value of 22.07, which is smaller than the critical 
2
95 0 20 . ; c  level of 31.41. This
indicates that the model is not misspecified for the whole period. This suggests that for the
whole sample period, a model without a binding constraint on production could be used to
explain investment behavior. However, since the constraint was already absent for a number
of years and since it may not have been binding throughout the whole period 1987-1996, it is
worthwhile to look at the model estimates for the subsamples 1982-1986 and 1987-1996 and
test for a structural break in 1987.
To perform this test the sample is split over the periods 1982-1986 and 1987-1996. The
model is re-estimated for both periods and the parameter estimates for the respective periods
are given in column two and three of table 3. For the period 1987-1996, the parameter
estimates do not differ much with respect to size, sign and significance from those for the
total sample period, so that interpretation of the parameters is the same. The J-statistic of
41.86 however indicates misspecification of the model in this case. The estimates for the
period 1982-1986 are somewhat different however. The value marginal product of capital is
now increasing in output price, the stock of capital and technological change with all three
parameters significantly different from zero. High output prices, a large stock of capital and a
high state of technology have positive effects on investment in period t. Feed input
(significant), other variable input, labor and land (all three not significant) have a negative
effect on period t investment, through the value marginal product of capital. Using parameters
and data for this period shows that production is now increasing in capital for all observations.
The positive and significant parameter a11 indicates that there are increasing marginal returns
of capital in production. Parameter estimates for the adjustment cost function are again
negative for the quadratic term and positive for the cubic term, both not significant at the 5%20
level, however. The J-statistic of 31.78 indicates that the model is only just rejected at the 5%
level of significance (critical value is 31.41).
In order to test for a structural break between the periods 1982-1986 and 1987-1996 the
test statistic is calculated by adding up the two values of the J-test statistics of both subsample
estimations, yielding a structural break test statistic of 73.64, which is larger than the critical
level of 
2
95 0 40 . ; c = 55.76. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions
hold before and after the breakpoint, i.e. the model is correctly specified before and after
1987, is firmly rejected. In other words, the hypothesis that manure productions rights did not
have a constraining effect on production, affecting investment decisions of farmers, is
rejected. The individual overidentifying restrictions tests suggest that before 1987 the model
is correctly specified and that after 1987 the model is misspecified.
It is interesting to test whether the change in the system of manure production rights from
non-tradable to tradable manure production rights relaxed the constraint on production. If this
is true, the model would be rejected for the period 1987-1993 and not rejected for 1994-1996.
Therefore the model is also estimated using these subsamples. The results are given in the
fourth and fifth column of table 3. For the period 1987-1993 the model is firmly rejected with
a J-statistic of 58.37. For the period 1994-1996, the J-statistic yields the considerably lower
value of 36.72, which still indicates rejection of the model at the 5% level of significance. The
structural break test statistic has a value of 95.10, indicating that the overidentifying
restrictions do not hold both before and after 1994. The lower J-test statistic for the period
1994-1996 however suggests that the production constraint may have become less binding in
the latter period due to tradability of the manure production rights.21
Borrowing constraints
The results provide evidence for the presence of binding constraints on production arising
from the manure policies implemented in 1987 and a relaxation of this constraint in 1994.
However, it could well be that the structural break found in 1987 has other causes. In the
literature, rejection of the overidentifying restrictions has often been attributed to the presence
of borrowing constraints that are not taken into account in this model (Whited, 1992; Hubbard
and Kashyap, 1992). It might well be that rejection of the model for the period 1987-1996 is
due to the presence of borrowing constraints that were absent in the period 1982-1986. The
financial position of farms may have worsened so that it was harder to obtain loans or banks
may have become more risk averse in supplying funds due to rising uncertainty about the
viability of the pig sector.
Extending the model by explicitly including borrowing constraints gives the same problem
as the presence of production constraints. If the borrowing constraint is binding, another
unobservable Lagrange multiplier is introduced in the model. A more simple procedure is to
split the 1987-1996 sample into a set of farms which is expected to be financially constrained,
and a set with farms that are not. Therefore, a debt-asset ratio is calculated for each farm and
farms with a debt-asset ratio higher than 70% are separated from the sample. A debt-asset
ratio of 70% and higher is usually seen as critical in obtaining loans (Mulder, 1994: 115).
Debts are defined as the sum of long term loans and short-term debts and the asset value is the
total balance value of assets. This yields a dataset containing 396 observations on 149 farms
with a debt-asset ratio lower than 70%, which are considered not to be financially constrained.
Only 33 farms (78 observations) had a higher debt-ratio and 8 out of 190 farms present in this
period had no observations on debts and loans. The dataset with farms that are expected not to
be financially constrained was used to estimate the model for the period 1987-1996. If
borrowing constraints were the real underlying cause of the rejection of the model in this22
period, then the model should not be rejected using this sample. However, the J-test statistic
for this estimation has a value 35.00, which still leads us to reject the model for this period.
So, this indicates that borrowing constraints are not the underlying cause for model rejection
in the period 1987-1996.
Conclusions and discussion
The objective of this paper is to assess whether manure production rights had a significant
constraining effect on capital investment in the Dutch pig sector over the period 1987-1996.
In order to answer this question an inter-temporal model of investment is developed, which is
augmented by a (potentially binding) constraint on production arising from the introduction of
manure production rights. The model developed in this paper provides an explanation for the
occurrence of zero investments by assuming that investment is zero for the range in which the
marginal benefits of investing are equal to or smaller than the purchase price of capital
leading to regimes for zero and positive investments.
In the theoretical model it is shown that a constraint on production implies a reduction in
investment. Furthermore, the empirical model shows that testing for the presence of these
constraints is straightforward using a GMM structural break test. If a binding constraint on
production was present in the period 1987-1996, then the unrestricted model is misspecified,
since the constraint is not taken into account. Direct modeling of the restricted model with a
binding constraint on production is not possible due to the unobservable Lagrange multiplier.
Although the model is not rejected for the whole sample period, its estimates are not
satisfactory. Parameter estimates for both the production function and the adjustment cost
function are not in accordance with theory. Estimates using the pre-manure production rights
period (1982-1986) sample however, are in line with theory, whereas the estimates for the
manure production rights period (1987-1996) are comparable to those for the whole sample.23
Using a GMM test for a known breakpoint provides evidence for the presence of a
structural break in 1987, supporting the hypothesis that manure policy has reduced
investments and therefore affected the long-run development of the Dutch pig sector.
Estimating the model for the periods 1987-1993 and 1994-1996 and applying this test for the
year 1994, in which manure production rights became tradable, shows that the constraint on
production became less binding due to the tradability of manure production rights.
Although the presence of a structural break in 1987 was demonstrated, this does not
automatically mean that this was caused by a binding constraint on production arising from
manure policy. There can be other sources for model rejection in the manure policy period
such as borrowing constraints or other aspects of the investment process that are not taken
into account in the model. Therefore, one should be careful with using the results. However,
using a subsample of farms that are not expected to be financially constrained still leads us to
reject the model for the period 1987-1996, which confirms the conclusion that manure
production rights affected investment processes negatively through its effects on production.24
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Table 1 Mean and standard deviation of variables used in chapter five
Variable Dimension/Base year Symbol Mean Standard
Deviation
Quantities
Capital investment 100.000 Dutch guilders of 1980 I 0.515 1.095
Capital 100.000 Dutch guilders of 1980 x1 5.673 4.093
Pig feed 100.000 Dutch guilders of 1980 x2 4.479 3.198
Other variable input 100.000 Dutch guilders of 1980 x3 1.320 1.021
Farm family labour 1000 hours x4 3.465 1.356
Land Hectares x5 8.470 9.767
Technological change Trend, 1980=1 x6 10.921 4.226
Price indices
Capital Base year 1980 p
I 1.239 0.101
Pig output Base year 1980 p 1.069 0.191
Period: 1980-1996.
Observations: 88227
Table 2 Sample averages for investment and investment/capital ratio (standard deviations in
parentheses)
Period Sample average It Sample average It/Kt   N
  1980-1986 0.496 (0.991) 0.099 (0.194) 225
  1987-1993 0.474 (1.100) 0.078 (0.143) 445
  1994-1996 0.621 (1.183) 0.094 (0.190) 212
Total 0.515 (1.095) 0.088 (0.169) 88228
Table 3 Parameter estimates for the Euler equation (standard errors in parentheses)
1982-1996 1982-1986 1987-1996 1987-1993 1994-1996
a1 -0.136 (0.092) 0.214 (0.052)
* -0.042 (0.078) -0.179 (0.030)
* 0.045 (0.016)
*
a11 0.006 (0.005) 0.013 (0.005)










* -0.019 (0.029) -0.032 (0.019) 0.006 (0.014) -0.001 (0.002)
a14 0.023 (0.017) -0.013 (0.009) 0.017 (0.014) -0.016 (0.006)
* 0.001 (0.002)











* -0.006 (0.005) -0.001 (0.008) -0.028 (0.006)
* 0.007 (0.001)
*
b3 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 2.0*10










J-statistic (d.f.) 22.07 (20) 31.78 (20) 41.86 (20) 58.37 (20) 36.73 (20)
N 650 165 485 333 152
     * Significant at the 5% level29
                                                          
1 Other elements in the legislation are concerned with the application of manure and
requirements on animal housing.
2 The number of dis-investments in the dataset used is small. In total there are 13 dis-
investments out of 1662 observations. An explanation for this particularly low number is that
farmers who sell their buildings or equipment are likely to quit farming and therefore leave
the dataset.
3 For a discussion on identifying and overidentifying restrictions see Hall (1999).
4 Hall and Sen (1999) provide a rigorous technical discussion on structural break tests in
GMM estimation. By decomposing the population moment restrictions into identifying and
overidentifying restrictions, they derive a test for parameter stability and a test for model
misspecification due to a structural breakpoint.